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I. INTRODUCTION
EAN Frankino, Professor Dowd, Distinguished Faculty, mem-
bers of the family of the late Professor Giannella, friends,
permit me to thank you all for the invitation, and the honor given
me to be your 14th Giannella Memorial lecturer. In the short
time I have been in your lovely campus I have been impressed by
the current of intellectually exciting activity I have experienced
here. It is obvious that Villanova takes seriously the principle that
small is not only beautiful, it is frequently better.
My inquiries into Donald Giannella's life disclosed very
quickly three things: He was a brilliant law professor, he was a
man of integrity and courage, and he was a man with-to quote
Dean J. Willard O'Brien-"an incredible sense of responsibility."
While I myself fall far short of these qualities, I yield to none in
my veneration of them. Moreover, Professor Giannella's work on
Religion and Public Order touches a theme that unifies all the
t This article is the edited text of the Fourteenth Annual Donald A.
Giannella Memorial Lecture at the Villanova University School of Law, April 5,
1990. The Villanova Law Review co-sponsors the Giannella Lecture.
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law.
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scholarship and activism that I have been involved in, viz., the
nature and quality of the public order that law defends and pro-
motes. My speech tonight has much to do with the public order of
South Africa in the 1990s.
Nelson Mandela, the most famous political prisoner in the
world, was released from a South African jail in February, 1990.
The release of Mandela was preceded by a speech to the South
African Parliament by Prime Minister deKlerk. That speech was
unprecedented in South African history. It marked the first clear,
unequivocal admission by the highest ranking South African offi-
cial that Apartheid was indefensible and that South Africa's future
must be decided by all South Africans, not simply by the white
elite and its hand-picked acolyte of cronies. Since the proclama-
tion of Apartheid as the official ideology of South Africa in 1948
by Dr. F. S. Malan, South Africa had traversed a long and tragic
path, projecting it into the position of a notorious violator of
human rights and a state having the dubious distinction of near
renegade status in contemporary international society.
II. WHAT Is APARTHEID?
Human rights scholars reviewing the nature of Apartheid
during the early 1980s described Apartheid as "a complex set of
practices of domination and subjugation, intensely hierarchized
and sustained by the whole apparatus of the state which affects
the distribution of all values."' It is a process which has meant
for those fortunate enough to be classified white, a bountiful
share of the goods, services, life opportunities, honors and secur-
ity. It has meant for those not classified white, a process of scar-
city and deprivation, a lack of opportunity and experience of both
psychological and physical impoverishment. In many ways, the
system by which the benefits and burdens of a modem state were
allocated on the basis of race is reminiscent of the kind of political
process generated by Nazi Germany, about which a major war had
been fought with South Africans of all races participating on the
side of the Allies.
III. IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND WORLD ORDER
Ideologies perform two basic functions. First, they provide
normative guidance for those who wish to partake of political ac-
1. M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsswEU. & L. CHEN, HumAN RIGTrrs AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 523 (1980) [hereinafter M. McDouGAL].
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tion. Second, they are frequently seen and used as justifications
rather than conditions of politically-motivated action. If the
twentieth century is at all remembered, and there are many mem-
orable things about it-two world wars, the Holocaust, the
thermo-nuclear age, the space age, the age of human rights-
among the most visible of remembrances will be the elevation of
simple myths into large-scale, all-consuming ideological systems
whose reach has been nothing short of global.
One has only to recall the ideologies of capitalism, fascism,
communism and various forms of imperialism to appreciate the
ease with which global conflicts could so easily be viewed, in their
essentials, as global-ideological conflicts. For example, World
War II pitted a three-way ideological conflict among the democra-
cies of the West, fascism and communism. Responsible theorists
of law and politics have viewed the post-World War II scene as
reflecting a close relationship between ideology and power. 2 In-
deed, several reputable international relations theorists concep-
tualize "World Order" in essentially bi-polar terms, namely, the
free world of the social democracies and the unfree world of com-
munist totalitarianism.3
It may be that the dramatic changes that have taken place in
eastern Europe and South Africa reflect to an important degree
the ascendence of pragmatism over excessively extended ideolog-
ical perspectives. It is of course too premature to predict a kind
of "end of ideology" scenario for world order, at least with re-
spect to ideological frames that have dominated politics for a
large part of the twentieth century. The issue I want to address is
how does South Africa fit into the global ideological picture?
IV. IDEOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND THE APARTHEID PROCESS
Apartheid did not start with a set of ideological preconcep-
tions about the proper role of race relations in a society. The
roots of segregation, racial discrimination, slavery, involuntary
servitude and the policies that permitted the physical extermina-
tion of the aboriginal peoples of South Africa have been an intrin-
2. See, e.g., McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Sys-
ens of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1959) (conduct of participants in
power process depends on their values and group identification).
3. See generally M. McDOUGAL AND W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981)
(course book examining moral and intellectual responsibilities in international
law).
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sic part of the history of South Africa. 4 In setting out some of
these unfortunate historical experiences, it must be kept in mind
that South African history also has produced a vision of human
relations that is the antithesis of the apartheid heritage. This his-
tory includes the heritage of the philanthropic movement of the
early nineteenth century, which focused explicitly on the well-be-
ing of the blacks and was part of the movement that led to the
abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire.5 There was
also the libertarian tradition of the free press, the importance, his-
torically, of the Rule of Law and the independence of the courts,
and the limited but important democratic rights for blacks in the
nineteenth century Cape.6 Most important was the development
of powerful institutions committed to black educational advance-
ment, such as the modem educational institutions at Lovedale
College, HealdTown College, Adams College and, most famous
of all, the University College of Fort Hare, the alma mater of al-
most every major black nationalist figure in South Africa and nu-
merous black leaders in other parts of Africa.
These traditions must be seen in light of the development of
the principles of moral order as an indispensible part of the strug-
gle for freedom and dignity of the black people of South Africa.
These principles were informed by the intellectual heritage of
Thoreau 7 and the practical sensibility of Mohandas Gandhi. It
was Gandhi who gave the world the principle that the struggle for
freedom itself must be a part of the moral experience of the
political actor, and part of the moral transformation of the
interlocutor.8
From these principles, black South Africa developed the con-
cept of nonviolent passive resistance to unjust laws. This con-
cept, introduced by Gandhi, has been a major part of the struggle
against Apartheid and has produced two Nobel Peace Prize win-
ners-the late chief Albert Luthuli and the legendary Bishop
Desmond Tutu. Moreover, although armed struggle was a major
part of the strategy of the liberation movement in South Africa,
the tactics of the United Democratic Front (U.D.F.), the trade un-
ions, churches and civic organizations have reasserted the impor-
4. See THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA TO 1870, at
40-63 (M. Wilson & L. Thompson eds. 1969).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 297-333.
7. H. THOREAU, WALDEN U. Shanley ed. 1970).
8. M. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS wITH
TRUTH (M. Desai trans. 12th ed. 1971).
1142 [Vol. 35: p. 1139
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tance of mass democratic, non-violent action to secure
liberation. 9
The struggle between the ascendance of the value system as-
sociated with discrimination and racial exploitation, and an alter-
native perspective of governance based on democratic, non-racial
values, has generated alternative ideological visions for the future
of South Africa. In a sense, these visions could not in the long
run have remained immune from the ideological currents charac-
teristic of the larger world arena. Indeed, what made Apartheid
so distinctive a phenomenon were the ideological assumptions
implicit in the rhetoric used to justify it. The key architect of the
ideology of Apartheid was Dr. H.F. Verwoerd. It was Verwoerd
who coined the phrase "separate development" to justify and ra-
tionalize the apartheid process.' 0
In order to have separate development, one needed a clean
classification of human typologies into separate groups or
"races." Hence, the institutional cornerstone of Apartheid be-
came the Population Registration Act of 1950." Law as an ele-
ment of social control, and an instrument of socio-political
engineering, would become an indispensible strut for the realiza-
tion of the Apartheid vision. To further maintain the integrity of
the system of ethnic or racial classifications, racial endogamy was
decreed by the Immorality Act' 2 and the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act.' 3 The Group Areas Act 14 and various acts estab-
lishing statal Apartheid (the creation of black, ethnic homelands)
were enacted to further entrench the racial purity of ethnic
groups. Finally, the Separate Amenities Act' 5 was enacted to reg-
ulate and control the patterns of racial interaction on a day-to-day
basis (separate toilets, public transport, sports, culture, educa-
tion, etc.). These laws were in many ways the institutional corner-
stones of Apartheid, and to some degree stimulated thinking
9. See Nagan, Law and Post-Apartheid South Africa, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 399,
414 (1988-89).
10. A. HEPPLE, VERWOERD 114 (1967).
11. Population Registration Act, No. 30 of 1950, 3 STAT. REPUBLIC S. AFR.,
CENSUS AND STATISTICS, at 71 (1973).
12. Immorality Act, No. 23 of 1957, 7 STAT. REPUBLIC S. AFR., CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE, at 611 (1973).
13. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949, 11 STAT. REPUBLIC
S. APR., HUSBAND AND WIFE, at 91 (1973).
14. Group Areas Act, No. 36 of 1966, 10 STAT. REPUBLIC S. AFR., GROUP
AREAS, at 141 (1973). See generally T. VANREENEN, LAND-ITS OWNERSHIP AND
OCCUPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (1962) (treatise on Group Areas Act).
15. Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953, 6 STAT. REPUB-
LIc S. AFR., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AT 311 (1973).
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5
Nagan: South Africa in Transition: Human Rights, Ethnicity and Law in th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: p. 1139
along the lines of an ambitious neo-idealism, an idealism that
would prescribe the normative framework of all human relations
for persons of divergent racial pedigrees. It was in many ways a
radical vision of human relations, a radical right-wing vision of
the nature of humanity as conditioned by fixed laws of ethnic
impermeability.
The philosophic roots of Verwoerd's rationalization of
Apartheid, as indicated, lay in the principles of so-called separate
development. In his view, society is composed of groups-more
precisely, ethnic and racial groups. Each racial group has implicit
the possibility of a national identity that needs to be self-realized
or self-actualized.' 6 In the context of South Africa, the diverse
groups or races could in reality be viewed as national "Geists" lo-
cated at different points on the ideal evolutionary continuum.
This formulation has Hegelian roots and, in effect, might be seen
as the Afrikaner's version of neo-idealism as ideology.' 7
The basic premise is the contention that all the nations-
races-of South Africa are involved in the historical progression
toward freedom and civilization; that some groups, the whites,
have been more advanced in historical progression and, indeed,
have been given a head-start by the ontological universal spirit.
From this premise, it is "logical" or "axiomatic" that the individ-
ual is a means and not an end; that the individual, in fulfilling his
historical mission, is circumscribed by that which the Geist or spirit
of his race or group has preordained. Moreover, these actualities
will differ from group to group because, as we have indicated,
some groups had been given a head-start by providence.18
Freedom of choice for the individual can exist only insofar as
freedom is reconcilable with the "historic" position of the group
to which the individual is assigned. It follows that individuals
must interact only within their own Geist or "race."' 9 Family or
marital arrangements across group lines would be irreconcilable
with the "destiny," i.e., the historical unfolding of the group.
Such arrangements are inappropriate and accordingly proscribed.
Racial endogamy would thus be an important institution for
maintaining the ethnic purity as well as the discrete evolution of
groups.
16. C. WEERAMANTRY, APARTHEID, THE CLOSING PHASES? (1980).
17. Id.
18. For a discussion of the development of positive law, see F. VON SAV-
GNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 24-31
(A. Hayward trans. 2nd ed. 1831).
19. Id.
1144
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Ideology as justification is different from ideology as opera-
tional reality. For example, Prime Minister Strijdom stated the
justification for Apartheid in terms that were far from prosaic: "I
am being as blunt as I can. I am making no excuses. Either the
white man dominates or the black man takes over. ... The only
way in which the Europeans can maintain supremacy is by domi-
nation."20 And Dr. Verwoerd, the arch-ideologist, put it this way,
"Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than
this: We want to keep South Africa White. . . 'Keeping it White'
can only mean one thing, namely, White domination, not 'leader-
ship' not 'guidance,' but 'control,' 'supremacy.' "21 John Vorster,
a recent Prime Minister of South Africa, explained that "[iln this
Parliament, whose business it is to decide the destiny of the Re-
public of South Africa, whites, and whites only, will have the right
to Sit." '22
The ideological justifications for Apartheid have tended to
focus on an idealist vision of the South African political landscape
and on the issue of groups and power. I do not wish to under-
state the economic stakes masked by ideological discourse. In-
deed, one of the obvious features of statal Apartheid-the
"homelands" policy-was the economic structure of the migra-
tory labor system. By depriving "urban" blacks of "citizenship,"
and by permitting residence in South Africa's industrial heartland
to be based primarily on tenuous employment status (the infa-
mous section 10 rights), the state sought to control the emer-
gence of a black industrialized class whose core identifications
would be defined by class rather than tribal factors. The system
failed, as we now know, because it was unable to prevent the
emergence of black trade unionism-one of the key anti-
Apartheid players inside South Africa. Apartheid also fostered
the insidious idea of using the homelands as a residuary labor
pool, while at the same time freeing the state of any social respon-
sibility for black families whose breadwinners were recruited for
urban labor, placed in all-male barracks, and separated from their
families for long periods.23 In other words, political power, eco-
nomic exploitation, and social irresponsibility went hand-in-hand.
20. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter Legal Consequences].
21. See South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.CJ. Pleadings 264.
22. Legal Consequences, supra note 20, at 18.
23, See M. McDoUGAL, supra note 1, at 547-50.
1990] 1145
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V. APARTHEID, RACISM AND SOCIAL PROCESS
As we consider the impact of ideological justification and the
expression of "real" reasons for the Apartheid process, it be-
comes important to understand the nature of Apartheid as an as-
pect of racial prejudice.
A sharper understanding of the problems of race-relations,
and more specifically the problems of racial-discrimination and
Apartheid, is important not only for an understanding of the so-
cial problems of Apartheid. It is important because Afrikaner-
dominated models of constitutionalism have assumed, with vary-
ing degrees of explicitness, the group nature of politics, and the
impermeable nature of "ethnic" groups as instruments of actual
or potential power. The 1961 South African Constitution made a
fairly crude division in the framework of constitutionalism and
ethnicity. There were, for power purposes, whites and non-
whites. The whites were constitutionally entitled to the franchise;
the blacks, which included the colored and the indians, were not.
The constitution of 1983 refined this framework: colored and in-
dians were included in a complicated tricameral parliament,
blacks (Africans) were excluded.2 4
Since the promulgation of the 1983 constitution, Afrikaner
intellectuals have sought other consitutional models that accom-
modate strong ethnic affiliations in segmented societies while
honoring the principles of democracy, individual civil and polit-
ical rights, and the rule of law. At the other end of the political
spectrum, the African National Congress (ANC) has built on its
own traditions, influenced by the principles contained in the At-
lantic Charter, and refined by the famous Freedom Charter of
195525 and its new consitutional guidelines for a non-racial dem-
ocratic South Africa.2 6 The ANC has stood firm on the principles
of non-racialism, majority rule democracy and universal
franchise. The critical question is whether the Afrikaner para-
digm overstates the central importance of impermeable group
identities based on race or ethnicity, or whether the ANC's vision
of a non-racial South Africa overstates the capacity of South Afri-
can society to transform exclusive ethnic-racial identities into
24. REP. S. AFR. CONST. Act 110 of 1983, Proc. 119 GG 9308, July 6, 1984,
pt. 6, § 67.
25. THE FREEDOM CHARTER OF SouTH AFRICA (U.N. Centre Against
Apartheid pub. 1979).
26. THE FREEDOM CHARTER OF SOUTH AFRICA (1988 version), reprinted in
ANC's Post-Apartheid 'Guidelines '--A-Y, Front File, Aug. 1988, at 1.
1146 [Vol. 35: p. 1139
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more inclusive non-racial identities as the core organizing condi-
tion of political society. In partial response to these challenges, it
may be useful to explore more intensively the nature of racial dis-
crimination and Apartheid and its relation to the problem of ra-
cial and ethnic group identity.
It requires no massive documentation to acknowledge that
racial prejudice, ethnic discrimination and similar social practices
are by no means unique to South Africa. Indeed, if we could put
the impacts of racial prejudice on a continuum, we would find the
social process of genocide at one extreme and affirmative action
at the other. For convenience, we may locate racial discrimina-
tion in the middle of the continuum, viewing Apartheid as an es-
pecially virulent form of racial discrimination, extending toward
genocide but obviously not as vile as the practice of genocide it-
self. Thus, while racial discrimination is outlawed internationally
by the International Convention, the Conventions against geno-
cide and Apartheid single out these practices as international
"crimes against humanity."2 7
The concept of "racial discrimination," like the concept of
Apartheid or "racism," is an elusive notion. One need only re-
member how voluably many American thinkers, some of great
professional eminence, declared without hesitation that affirma-
tive action is institutionalized racism. Indeed, one eminent jurist
of the political right made the charge in the bluntest of terms
when he wrote, after the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 28 that those who favored affirma-
tive action were "racist." 2 9 Now it is hardly worth refuting the
notion that four Justices supported the principle of affirmative ac-
tion in Bakke. These Justices could hardly be labelled as racist
with any measure of credibility. With this measure of public con-
fusion about the notion of racial discrimination itself, it may be
worthwhile exploring more precisely what we mean by racial dis-
crimination since an appreciation of its etiology may be useful in
understanding the "what" and "why" of Apartheid, and how an
Apartheid-conditioned society may transform itself in the direc-
tion of a more just social order that honors the human rights of
all its citizens.
Discrimination is practiced by individuals, some of whom ex-
ercise the formal and/or effective power of a community to enact
27. L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 197-204 (1981).
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1977, at 16, col. 6.
1990] 1147
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policies that institutionalize discrimination. By focusing on indi-
viduals, I do not mean to undervalue the most significant element
of the notion of racial discrimination, viz., that when it becomes
institutionalized it exhibits its most destructive impacts on soci-
ety. Indeed, when racial discrimination is institutionalized it is
sometimes the most important element of human interaction in
its particular context. However, what I am trying to get at are the
conditions of racial discrimination, to show that it may be more
ubiquitous than what is observed even in its institutional manifes-
tation, and that it therefore requires more sustained and
thorough strategies of action to eliminate or contain it. Discrimi-
nation can be, and is, practiced by individuals at every level of
social organization. This makes the interplay of personality on
the one hand, and culture on the other, important interdetermin-
ing variables in establishing the relative salience of racial discrimi-
nation in any community.
To begin to understand the social process of discrimination
one must account for the conditions that shape personality forma-
tion in early childhood. Innocuous child rearing and nurturing
practices may in sum amount to "deprivations" from the perspec-
tive of the child, but may be viewed as "normal" from the adult
vantage point. Early years are crucial in the individual becoming
conscious of the self, i.e., becoming aware that the self is an "I."
A vital part of early child development is the emergence of an
awareness of individuals other than one's self (non-self others).
Some of these "selves" are internalized as a "we" and some as the
"other" or the "they." It is often thought that anxiety, insecurity
and allied deprivations influence or condition the individual's
conception of the self as an "I" and more broadly on how "I" will
be defined to include "others" in the sense of the "we." 30
In other words,
early years shape fundamental identification patterns
and determine the essential ''I and contingent "we."
Patterns of nurturance and early socialization do not
30. Nagan, Conflict of Laws: Group Discrimination and the Freedom to Marry-A
Policy Science Prologue to Human Rights Decisions, 21 How. L.J. 1, 7 (1978). For a
discussion of the influence of oppression and exploitation on the development
of a group identity and the translation of ethnicity consciousness into social pro-
test and resistance against oppression, see Nagengast & Kearney, Mixtec Ethnicity:
Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism, 25 LATIN AM. RES. REV.,
No. 2 61, 61-91 (1990). See also D. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1989) (lecture delivered
under auspices of Maurice Webb Memorial Trust in association with University
of Natal, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, July-Aug. 1989).
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take place in a vacuum. Children are born into contexts
in which the facts of social differentiation are ubiquitous.
The patterns of social stratification (including a con-
sciousness of social differentiation) represent a culture-
context that is transmitted intergenerationally in varying
degrees of symbolic intensity to every personality sys-
tem. The etiology of social differentiation is much dis-
puted. That it exists is undisputed. That it has been
accentuated in contemporary society by the division of
labor and specializations that attend it is also common-
place. When patterns of social stratification emerge
more concretely from the social process, and when these
patterns have a close alignment with the distribution of
power, wealth, and indeed all other base values which
sustain and modify these class and caste divisions, pow-
erful symbol-events (generated from these interactions)
create the conditions under which the "I" defines the
"self" by including within the "we", groups most closely
identified with the "class," .caste" or "ethnic" position
of the kinship [or family] unit of primary affiliation. The
key factor which lays the foundation for the exclusivist
identity, lies ultimately in the seemingly innocuous pat-
terns of child rearing and nurturance.
The ability of the self to identify with an in-group
and to identify and exclude an out-group appears to de-
rive from the communication of events relating to identi-
fication patterns that are accorded a symbolic character.
Thus, such facts as sex, color, race, group affiliation, age,
birth, language, religion, political belief, appearance,
class, and intellect, are the ubiquitous symbolic pegs that
[the individual internalizes as part of the "we"]. 3'
Alternatively, they may in context be sufficiently alien and thus
serve to identify and isolate targets for invidious prejudice and
discrimination. "However, the most important of these indicia
for the social process of discrimination has undoubtedly been
race, color, and [ethnicity]." 3 2
The event sequence that might be deemed to consti-
tute an act of invidious prejudice or discrimination (irrel-
evant to the merits or the capabilities of particular
31. Id.
32. Nagan, supra note 30, at 7-8.
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individuals or groups) may be set out as follows: (1) lo-
cating the target of one's hostility, (2) subjective commu-
nication of signs for the transmission of negative drives
or impulses toward the identifiable target, (3) the physi-
cal events (resources) used by the communicator to rein-
force predispositions about the pattern of dominance
and subordination in communicators and targets. s
Patterns of inter-group hostility are clearly part of a recurring
pattern of social dynamics. Genocide is the result of a process
that is triggered by "seemingly innocent and mundane attitudes
and behavior."5s4 It is tied to the process of psycho-social identifi-
cation in which the self is distinguished from the "other." "But
once the 'other,' an alien group, is identified, the precondition of
genocide has been fulfilled; for genocide cannot [scarcely] be
conceived without a cultural definition of the target group."935
Assuredly, this identification is the precondition for inter-
group hostility, and particularly the manifestation of various
forms of discrimination against diverse social groups. From this
perspective, it takes little imagination to see that various forms of
discrimination manifested along tribal, religious, racial or caste
lines are recurring social phenomena.
This description of the social process of racial discrimination
gives neither an optimistic sense of an understanding of the con-
ditions of this social pathology, nor a quick fix in the prescription
of its cure. The abolition of all the "laws" sanctioning discrimina-
tion, or Apartheid, will not necessarily result in a level of good
race-relations practice. As a result, there should be no great
cause for public relief at the end of legal discrimination or
Apartheid. The eradication of the law on the books may attack
the official myth system that has legitimized discrimination, but
the operational code-what happens in fact on the ground-may
be quite different. The first sound principle to keep in mind is
that good race-relations do not just happen.
Accordingly, good race-relations in a post-Apartheid South
Africa, in my view, will not just happen. Why? Because even if
the Apartheid laws are abrogated and prohibited in the new, post-
Apartheid constitution, that is to say even when the new, official
myth prescribes a non-racial society, the operative code may still
33. Id. at 9.
34. M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 3, at 41.
35. Id.
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endure, keeping the practical reality, or a significant part of it,
intact. Under the conditions that might once more legitimize ra-
cial discrimination or Apartheid-this "rough beast," its "hour"
once more come round, might be "slouching" toward Pretoria to
be born. 6
In my view, the psychodynamics that produce the predisposi-
tional elements of personal identity, making it inevitable that fun-
damental identity must distinguish between the I, the we and the
other, also give us an essential precondition for racial discrimina-
tion, Apartheid, and ultimately genocide. This is not to say that
these social pathologies are an inevitable outcome of a society's
social and psychological processes. The capacity to identify the
other as a non-self-other, a non-we, so-to-speak, does not without
further cultural conditioning and socialization produce the full-
fledged prejudice-prone personality we identify with the
Afrikaanse Weerstand Beweging (AWB) or analogously, the Ku
Klux Klan. From this it would appear that there are few, if any of
us, who are not possible candidates, at least psychologically, for
an AWB or KKK membership. In my view that is the bad news,
and the reason why race-relations matters are one of the most
important public policy issues that confront our own society, cer-
tainly South Africa, and in a larger sense the entire planetary
community.
As we proceed to tease out the implications of this analysis,
let me enter a caution. It may plausibly, be assumed that what I
am suggesting is that ethnic or racial identities are impermeable
conditions of being, that as a matter of public policy nothing ef-
fective can in the long term be done about them. Certainly, the
transgenerational continuity of ethnic conflict is significant cause
for concern and possible despair. My note of caution is this: I do
not accept the thesis of ethnic or racial impermeability, at least to
the extent that it would justify the existence or continuation of
racially discriminating practices.
As I see it, the structure of conventional culture and sociali-
zation, indeed the political culture itself, must be constantly ap-
praised and evaluated to determine whether we are either
reproducing or reinforcing the culture of discrimination,
Apartheid, or even genocide. What confronts us is not inevitable
determinism, but a challenge-from the local and personal to the
planetary community as a whole. An aspect of this challenge may
36. Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE LITERATURE OF ENGLAND 1147 (G. An-
derson, W. Buckler & M. Veeder 3d ed. 1979).
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be observed by considering the following question: Are we pro-
ducing personality types that in general are capable of identify-
ing-ultimately-with all of our species? More broadly, we must
ask whether we are reproducing a culture, an operative ideology,
that is universally committed to the principle of human dignity or
indignity, that honors the principle of respect for all human be-
ings, and that abhors racism, sexism, and any ism that denigrates
the dignity of all people.
In other words, the culture of human rights must be an im-
portant part of the perspective (the myth system), or more con-
ventionally, the ideological system, and must be confirmed by a
level of institutionalization that goes beyond governmental initia-
tives of affirmative action and equal opportunity to a level or
ubiquity that touches every culturally relevant level of social or-
ganization. Harold Lasswell, in a thoughtful piece which was the
product of a lifetime of grappling with the problems of violence,
personality and culture, presented the kind of possibility modern
culture provides as a challenge to world order. This was articu-
lated in his famous futuristic vision of world public order and the
importance of a "future system of identity" in the global culture
of human rights and human dignity.3 7 Lasswell wrote:
Clearly the sharing of a common set of identifying sym-
bols makes it possible for larger numbers of people to
act together more quickly than if common cues are miss-
ing. Differences of local culture, class, interest and per-
sonality were partially overcome by invoking established
predispositions to accept a degree of common
leadership. 38
Ultimately the fiend here, or the limiting condition, is the cul-
tural-psychological reproduction of chauvinism, nativism and pa-
rochialism-all of which are essential elements of an exclusive
kind of identity system.
The challenge to world order is the respect for cultural dis-
tinctiveness, and for cultural pluralism that adds to the richness of
the experience of being human, but which is fully compatible with
the capacity to identify with others, with aliens, so-to-speak, with all
37. Lasswell, Future Systems of Identity in the World Community, in THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER VOLUME IV: THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 3-31 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972)
38. Id. at 13.
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of humanity in a universal sense. That is to say, a system of iden-
tity that is inclusive.
The 1990s will directly challenge South Africa, Europe and
the rest of us about whether we can make a new paradigm of pub-
lic order that is both psychologically and culturally embedded in
the principle of human dignity and whether we can make human
rights, in the comprehensive sense, an indispensible element of a
global new deal. A brief view of the political trends in South Af-
rica illuminates the factors important to the process of transition
in the 1990s.
VI. TRENDS IN TRANSITION TO A NEW SOUTH AFRICA:
STRATEGIES OF CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC ORDER
In 1948 the Nationalist Party came into power in South Af-
rica. It came to power in an election that largely precluded the
non-white, black sections of the population. Its program and pol-
icy were encapsuled in a word, a neologism, which was to gain
international notoriety: Apartheid.
The ruling Nationalist Party began to institutionalize a radi-
cal program of policies whose roots were concededly found in the
National Socialist policies of Nazi Germany, and the fascist poli-
cies of Mussolini's Italy. The fundamental idea behind the
Apartheid scheme was the idea of white supremacy. 39 The critical
policy problem was how to secure and enhance it for the indefi-
nite future. The critical solution lay in the policies and programs
of white control and racial separatism.
Implementation of the Apartheid program began with a vast
edifice of legislation and an enormous bureaucratic structure to
man the pumps of the Apartheid administrative state. To organ-
ize the population based on rigid racial lines, the state enacted the
Population Registration Act,40 which mandated that every human
being in South Africa be assigned a racial identity from which all
rights, powers, privileges, immunities and disabilities would flow.
To ensure compliance with the dictates of the Apartheid machine,
the state took direct control of education for blacks. It instituted
a massive arsenal of security laws and policies to secure the ex-
tinction and repression of those who disagreed with its policies,
especially those who had the temerity to voice their disagreement
39. For a discussion of the influence of the Nazi movement on the National-
ist Party leaders and Afrikaner people, see generally B. BUNTING, THE RISE OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN REICH 54-68 (1964).
40. Population Registration Act, supra note 11.
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and more so those who attempted to do something about it. The
evolution of a national security garrison state logically, 41 almost
inexorably, followed from the radical nature of Apartheid. The
Apartheid process generated sustained patterns of resistance.
This naturally led to an outcry from other nation states who
would openly object to the Apartheid state.
The government of India, one of the first major third world
powers to become a full-fledged member of the United Nations,
took the issue of Apartheid to the U.N. 42 The basis for India's
action was that these policies were targeted, inter alia, at the In-
dian minority in South Africa. Starting out as a matter of interna-
tional concern about human rights violations against Indian
South Africans, the U.N. broadened its interests to include the
whole problem of Apartheid since the entire edifice was designed
to violate the human rights of all non-white people.
Initially, the U.N. sought to promote dialogue and concilia-
tion between interested countries and South Africa. These con-
sultative efforts came to naught as South Africa steadfastly
maintained that the treatment of its black population was a matter
of domestic internal sovereignty and not an international matter.
As the state began to close off all avenues for dissent and political
expression among the Apartheid victims, the strategies of the now
banned black political parties began to change. The historical
legacy had been the legacy of Gandhi. The core strategy was that
of passive, non-violent resistance to unjust laws and governmen-
tal oppression.
With the outlawing of the African National Congress (ANC)
and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the early 1960s, to-
gether with a level of state violence never before experienced by
black resisters, the black political parties sought to model them-
selves on the movements of revolutionary violence that sought
the overthrow of colonialism. 43 Thus, the ANC became a move-
41. See CHANGING PATTERNS OF MILITARY PoLmcs 51-68 (S. Huntington ed.
1962) (chapter by H. Lasswell entitled "The Garrison-State Hypothesis
Today").
42. J. HEUNIS, UNITED NATIONS VERSUS SOUTH AFRICA 250 (1986) (govern-
ment of India made application to United Nations regarding treatment of Indi-
ans in South Africa); M. McDOUGAL, supra note 1, at 521.
43. M. MBEKI, PROFILE OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 28
(1987) (in late 1950s and early 1960s, black nationalist parties in South Africa
concluded that only way to dislodge white minority regime was through armed
struggle); P. WALSHE, THE RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 339-40 (1971) (noting frequent tendency to view
Negro struggle for civil rights in America as precedent for African emancipation
in South Africa).
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ment of national liberation seeking to mobilize all coercive and
diplomatic strategies, including strategies of violence to secure
the demise of the Apartheid regime.
At the international level, the complex interplay between the
elites and counter-elites in South Africa, the agencies of formal
international decision (the U.N., the O.A.U., the World Court)
and the major power-players in the international system such as
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., all are decisional factors in the com-
plex unfolding drama of South Africa. 44 These core players have
responded with a cautious process of delegitimatizing the Preto-
ria authorities, and an even more cautious enhancing of the legiti-
macy of the struggle against South Africa. While much of this
response has occurred through the U.N., major players have
somewhat hedged the bet. With a more circumscribed role for
the Soviet Union in some international arenas of conflict and the
greater watch-dog policies over executive adventures in the for-
eign policy domain of the United States, the superpowers them-
selves seem to have receded from the idea that revolutionary
violence (left or right) will necessarily lead to beneficent out-
comes. South Africa had exasperated both the Russians and the
Americans.
When we view the South African scene in its regional con-
text, some sobering facts emerge. The status quo, white elite, has
constructed an entity close to a renegade state-the Apartheid
state. This state has been unrestrained in its use of violence in-
side South Africa and the region. The death toll is itself stagger-
ing, and the evidence of human rights abuse is of epidemic
proportions .45
The reaction of the South African liberation movement is
harder to appraise. Its political inheritance is the tradition of pas-
sive, non-violent resistant to unjust laws and governmental op-
pression. Yet the liberation movements are frequent targets of
criticism for using tactics of insurrectionary violence. In the face
of extreme status quo violence and human rights abuse (the
Sharpeville massacre of 1960 is a major example), and the ban-
44. See Stead, Moscow's Call to De Beers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1990, at D2, col.
1; Bums, Soviets, in Shift, Press for Accord in South Africa, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1989,
at Al, col. 1.
45. See AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STAKES AND THE
STANCE 218-20 (R. Lemarchand ed. 1978) [hereinafter AMERICAN POLICY] (dis-
cussing social process of deprivations for non-white individuals); K. GRUNDY,
THE MILITARIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS (1986); A. SEIDMAN, THE
ROOTS OF CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1984).
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ning of the prime black political organizations, black leadership,
the liberation movement made the decision to go underground
and to model themselves as a movement committed to the use of
both coercive and persuasive strategies to advance the cause of
"liberation."
Few, if any, articulate segments of the international commu-
nity have challenged the "legality" of armed struggle to achieve
liberation in South Africa. The issue is not "law" in the strict
sense. International law "operationally" seems to tolerate a grey
area of coercion by elites and counter-elites. Responsibility for
the results of violence may indeed at the point of negotiation, be
"negotiated" away. But the existential question remains: Has vi-
olence in defense of the status quo, and violence to eradicate it,
enhanced the prospect of a regional or international public order
of human dignity?
The use of passive resistance, non-violent or less violent
techniques of struggle on the West Bank and Gaza have, I sus-
pect, restored a moral credibility and strength to the plight of the
dispossessed Palestinians. It may also be suggested that the non-
violent methods of protest of the U.D.F. and the mass Democratic
Movement in South Africa have had a restorative, mass appeal to
South Africa's oppressed people inside that country, and have
had a moral impact on the policies and practices of at least some
elements of the white ruling caste. Perhaps the cruelest dilemma
facing those who struggle for human rights in a context where a
state is a notorious human rights abuser, and where that state is
unrestrained in its use of violence against its opponents, posits
the following questions: Do human rights proponents have a legal
and a moral obligation to use that proportion of violence neces-
sary to defend themselves, i.e., do the oppressed have a right of
self-defense from state human rights abuse? To what extent
should counter-elites forgo the right of self-defense for the even
higher moral precept that the oppressed are themselves trans-
formed by the suffering of struggle, that "true" struggle against
injustice transforms both victim and interlocutor? Did Gandhi,
Luthuli and King set a standard too lofty in their protest, to man's
conscience, that violent solutions to human problems are obscene
and degrading? Or as we make an inventory of the cost of reac-
tionary and revolutionary violence do we discover somewhat cyni-
cally that leopards only change their spots when they move from
one spot to another? In other words, were the Kings, the Luthu-
lis, the Gandhis and the Tutus of the world the "real" realists
1156 [Vol. 35: p. 1139
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because they saw more clearly than most that violence is generally
a high cost non-solution to difficult problems of coexistence,
peace and justice?
Implicit in the message of Gandhi, Luthuli, Tutu and King is
the integrity of the struggle as well as the integrity of the objec-
tives of the struggle for justice, respect and dignity. A further
implication in this perspective is a message of restoration and
hope in the capacity for moral growth in the human species, and a
pervasive optimism that a public order committed to the dignity
of man is not a far-fetched idea.
As we survey the decisional challenges, we may with the ben-
efit of hindsight and the wisdom of historical experience suggest
some basic, but I hope provocative, issues to this presentation.
(1) Does human rights law as well as general interna-
tional law place some limits on a state's use of power
and violence against its own people?
(2) Has the use of revolutionary violence at the end of
the day generated the promise of a better world or a
better South Africa?
(3) In a world of changing conditions and trends, is it
the height of folly to demand "no change" and to
counter the demand for "immediate change,"
whatever the price to humanitarian values?
(4) Does the evolution of passive resistance, and mass
democratic nonviolent resistance restore the moral
character of the very process of struggle for dignity
and respect?
(5) May modern human rights processes provide norma-
tive guidance to revolutionary change by posing the
interplay of both revolutionary means and ends as a
dynamic but vital challenge to the very human agents
of decision who hold our well-being and respect in
their hands?
While there are structural forces in the social process that
make change difficult to achieve by decisional interventions, a
great deal of change or non-change is indeed a function of deci-
sional intervention. An awareness of this issue may enhance the
sense of responsibility on the part of those who welcome change
and work for a public order of human dignity. The case of South
Africa represents the twin issues of human rights abuses and the
rights of those victims to use extra-constitutional methods to
1990] 1157
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change the system. That is to say, the victims of human rights
violations claim a right to revolution. Complex issues of law, in-
cluding international law and policy are implicated here. Also,
decisional responses to the claims of the Pretoria authorities and
their antagonists leave little room for a value-free neutrality.
VII. TRENDS TOWARD A NEW CONsTITUriONAL ORDER
In our analysis, let us first look to the trends leading to the
undermining of Apartheid. A review of these trends must take
into account several events that have had a decisive impact on the
relevant historical events that have moved in the direction of un-
dermining the credibility of the Apartheid state, and thus the pos-
sibility of its long term viability.
By the mid 1970s, the key institutions of Apartheid were sub-
stantially in place. These institutions included the balkanization
of South Africa as the homelands policies began to be put into
practical effect. The homelands policy meant mass population re-
movals. 46 These removals-a form of forced transmigration-re-
sulted in the mass deportation of millions of black South Africans
in one of the most far-reaching instances of the mass displace-
ment of a people since the Nazi activities during World War II. In
"white" South Africa itself, the Group Areas Act had created a
virtual new kind of urban environment as population groups were
coerced into their exclusive racial group areas. Again, this was a
phenomenon almost unique in the context of comparative urban
demography. The framework was designed to be sustained by the
policy of Kragdadigheid (brute force), and the full arsenal of re-
pressive institutions characteristic of a modern garrison state.
The near perfect blueprint of Apartheid received its first
clear initial jolt from an event far beyond the borders of South
Africa, let alone southern Africa. A group of Portuguese officers
executed a coup d' itat in Portugal. The coup was not predicted by
the major intelligence agencies, but it had major implications for
the cordon sanitaire around southern Africa. The coup led to a Por-
tuguese pullout from Angola and Mozambique, and radically
changed the conditions of power in the southern Africa region.
Specifically, Smith's Rhodesia became vulnerable, and South Af-
rica itself began to feel a level of anxiety never felt before. 47
Liberation in Angola and Mozambique made Rhodesia vul-
46. See generally M. MBEKI, supra note 43 (discussion of repressive tactics of
white minority regime).
47. For a discussion of American concern regarding African issues in Rho-
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nerable, made the defense of Namibia's borders far more expen-
sive and, ultimately, embroiled South Africa in regional
aggression with both overt military and covert intelligence opera-
tions. These activities resulted in a destabilization policy in South
Africa that has caused untold suffering and arrested economic
and social development in the region at enormous human cost.
These events also brought Cuba into southern Africa as a major
player, and more pertinently, brought United States and Soviet
Union concerns to the region with all the potentials of regional
conflicts having global possibilities.48
Celebrations were held in the black township of South Africa,
honoring the liberation struggles and successes in the former
Portuguese colonies. But the event that shook the foundations of
Apartheid occurred inside South Africa and was led by the chil-
dren of a blandly named ghetto outside of South Africa, the South
West Township-known the world over by the acronym: Soweto.
The events that occurred in Soweto in 1976 are a special, almost
unique example of Apartheid resistance. It was triggered and
sustained by school children, a vast number of whom were not
even past the primary school years. The students of Soweto
started by protesting the inferior education they were allocated;
they protested the fact that they were required to learn Afrikaans,
the language, as they saw it, of the oppressor. Finally, they pro-
tested the impotence of their parents, leaders and elders, who, as
they saw it, had absorbed the indignities of Apartheid in far too
passive a manner. The Soweto revolt spread throughout South
Africa. In every major center, children boycotted classes,
marched, protested and sought to disrupt the smooth efficiency of
the Apartheid state machine.49 The 1976 events of Soweto put an
indelible stamp of horror on what Apartheid could do to its chil-
dren. There were appalling tales of children who had been killed,
wounded, teargassed, detained, tortured, imprisoned, and for the
lucky ones, exiled.
Fast on the heels of Soweto another unlikely event shook the
foundations of the Apartheid state. Following the notoriety of the
Watergate scandal, this event was aptly named the Muldergate
desia, including racial discrimination, United Nations' sanctions, economic in-
terest and the use of violence, see AMERICAN POLICY, supra note 45, at 173-201.
48. Id. at 203-46, (discussing various strategies by United States and Soviet
Union to peacefully bring about changes in South Africa while protecting their
economic and other interests in the process).
49. Id. at 220-24 (discussing revolt of school children in South Africa's
Black ghettos and potential ultimate effect of these events).
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scandal-after Connie Mulder, a minister under whose jurisdic-
tion much of the scandal took place. 50 Muldergate put to rest the
notion of the incorruptible Afrikaner politician. The Afrikaner,
too, came at a price, and could be seduced by the temptations of
the good life. But the scandal reached into the highest levels of
the Afrikaner elite as both Prime Minister Vorster, the architect of
the police state, and his henchman General Van der Berg, Chief
of the security police, were sent out to pasture. P.W. Botha as-
sumed the reins of white power. It was Botha who proclaimed for
all the world that the Afrikaner would have to "adapt or die,"
signaling that he would retreat form the rigor of ideological
Apartheid and move public policy in the direction of "reform," in
what became known as the neo-Apartheid alternative. 51
The relevance of fortuitous circumstances in the transforma-
tion of South Africa increased when the Reagan Administration,
which sought to legitimate the neo-Apartheid reform program of
Mr. Botha, instead had to implement the most comprehensive
anti-Apartheid legislation ever enacted by any United States gov-
ernment. I refer of course to the sanctions under the Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.52 Indeed, Mr. Botha is in
50. The Muldergate scandal involved the use of state funds to wage a prop-
aganda war on behalf of South Africa. For a further discussion of the Mulder-
gate scandal, see AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STAKES AND THE
STANCE, SECOND EDITION 245-48 (R. Lemarchand 2d ed. 1981).
51. For a review of the Botha regime's "changes" promised in this "adapt
or die" speech, see South Africa: Positive Developments Continue in BACKGROUNDER
Spring, 1983 [hereinafter Positive Developments].
52. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988). For a summary of the factors leading
to passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act, see Sanctions: The Time Has Come!, in WASH-
INGTON NOTES ON AFRICA (Summer 1985).
In 1985, the "issue of South African apartheid finally emerged as a domi-
nant legislative agenda item." Id. at 1. The proposed Anti-Apartheid Act of
1985 was overwhelmingly approved in the House, 295 to 127, on June 4, 1984.
Id. The broad support for the bill in the House was the "direct" result of the
agitation against Apartheid generated by the Free South Africa movement. Id.
The 1985 bill contained a laundry-list of sanctions including: a ban on new cor-
porate investment in South Africa; a ban on United States bank loans to the
South African government; a ban on the importation of gold coins; a ban on
computer sales to the South African government and a ban on nuclear collabo-
ration with South Africa.
There were several Republican efforts to weaken the bill including an
amendment that sanctions not take effect unless the African National Congress
(ANC) unilaterally renounced violence or if a referendum among South African
blacks disapproved of sanctions. Id. The most vociferous defender in the
United States Congress of the Apartheid regime is SenatorJesse Helms of North
Carolina. Helms led a filibuster against the bill and was supported by several
conservative Senators, including: Jeremiah Denton (R-AL); John East (R-NC);
Jake Gan (R-UT); Orrin Hatch (R-UT); Chic Hecht (R-NV); Gordon Humphrey
(R-NH); Paul Laxalt (R-NV); James McClure (R-ID); Steven Symms (R-ID);
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part blamed for the passage of the bill because of his crude in-
transigence, lack of diplomatic sophistication and poor media
presence. But it was hardly to be expected that the Reagan ad-
ministration, one of South Africa's "friendliest," would be the
bearer of the sanctions dagger. A further element of fortuity
came when P.W. Botha suffered a stroke last year, as South Africa
grappled with internal unrest and international sanctions became
more and more effective. Botha was reluctant to give up power
and had to be virtually coerced from office. The new leader was
deKlerk, who proceeded this year to legalize the principal black
opposition groups and who, of course, released Nelson Mandela.
As we complete our trend analysis we are provided with a para-
dox as a result of these fortuitous events. The current trends, yet
undeveloped, illustrate the paradox.
South Africa is a bastion of anti-communism-for what this is
worth in this day and age. One of the unpredictable elements in
the transition process is the evolution of South Africa's relatively
cozy ties with the Soviet Union. Let me add at once that the
U.S.S.R. was, and is, a long-time ally of the ANC, and one of its
staunch backers on the international scene. The brokering of the
Namibia accords and the exodus of the Cubans from Angola
could not have been done without Soviet cooperation. High level
diplomatic talks have been held between Soviet and South African
foreign service functionaries. The U.S.S.R. intervened to prevent
South Africa's expulsion from the international Atomic Energy
Agency. Very importantly, the Soviet-South African cooperation
on the marketing of gold and diamonds has been to the mutual
benefit of both parties. 53 Indeed, since the imposition of sanc-
tions by the United States, many South Africans have viewed the
Soviet Union differently. And with the policies of glasnost and per-
Strom Thurmond (R-SC); and Malcolm Wallop (R-WY). The bill died in the
Senate. Id. at 2.
By 1985, the European Economic Community and other United States allies
were no longer willing to tolerate a "business-as-usual" posture regarding South
Africa. Id. at 3. Moreover, the UN Security Council, with the United States and
Great Britain abstaining, passed a resolution to encourage the adoption of vol-
untary economic sanctions against South Africa. Id,
For relevant background on the debate over United States sanctions, see
Lewis, House Panel Backs New South Africa Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at
A6, col. 1. On the efforts of the Reagan Administration to derail congressional
sanctions, see Gwertzman, Buying Time on Sanctions, N.Y. Times,July 16, 1986, at
Al, col. 5. One administrative measure designed to mollify Congress was the
appointment of a black ambassador to South Africa. See Gwertzman, U.S. Said to
Pick Black Diplomat To be Ambassador to South Africa, N.Y. Times, Aug 30, 1986, at
A4, col. 5.
53. Bums, supra, note 44.
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estroika, and the sense that there must be flexibility on the part of
the liberation movement, Soviet influence has clearly improved
the security picture for white South Africa and generated condi-
tions that favor a negotiated solution to the South African crisis.
VIII. SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS: THE LEGACY OF
THE PAST AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE
South Africa has a turbulent constitutional history. Indeed,
the founding of South Africa and the possible constitutional mod-
els that were considered for unifying the South African state were
themselves controversial, particularly from the point of view of
black South Africans who feared the fate of black political rights
in a unionized South Africa that might be dominated by an electo-
rate majority of white Afrikaners. The model that eventually did
emerge was associated with Westminster majoritarian politics,
with the locus of power substantially allocated to the Cabinet
comprised of responsible ministers.M The concept of majoritari-
anism must, of course, be qualified. The only blacks permitted to
vote were those who met certain basic franchise qualifications and
who were citizen domiciliaries of the Cape Province. This meant
that blacks in Natal, the Orange Free state and the Transvaal were
not given voting rights under the South Africa Act of 1910. No
black could be a member of Parliament or hold a position in gov-
ernance where parliamentary membership was a prerequisite.
The role of the courts under the South Africa Act appears to be
modeled on the judicial role as defined by the English experience
of constitutional governance. This kind of constitutional system,
of course, operates on the mandate of the voting majority, and
the role of the court in the protection of political and civil rights
of individuals, minorities and the disenfranchised was accordingly
limited.
The framework of electoral politics in South Africa was de-
fined by the demographic reality of the electoral college. What
this meant was the within the framework of this modified West-
minster model, the balance of power within white politics main-
tained a reasonable equilibrium with black and colored voters
often being an important part of the balance of power. It became
clear to Afrikan strategists that Afrikaner dominance of South Af-
rican politics would depend in the first instance on removing
54. For a discussion of the evolution of the constitution, see L. BOULLE,
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE APARTHEID STATE 149-70 (1984); Nagan, supra
note 9.
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black and colored voters from the common voters' role. In the
1930s the Cape blacks were removed from the common voters'
role by a procedure that appeared to be facially at variance with
the South African Constitution. The South African Constitution
held that the constitutional rights of blacks could not be termi-
nated except by the use of a special parliamentary procedure.
This procedure required both the Senate and the House of As-
sembly to convene unicamerally and secure the constitutional
change of black rights by a two-thirds vote. These sections of the
constitution were known as the entrenched sections of the South
Africa Act. In the 1930s the South African Parliament sitting bi-
camerally terminated the voting rights of the Cape Africans. This
action was challenged in the appellate division of the South Afri-
can Supreme Court in Ndlwana v. Hofineyr.55 The Supreme Court
held that in the South African constitutional system, the principle
of parliamentary sovereignty is paramount. Since parliament had
acted and parliament was legislatively supreme, parliament could
change the constitution as it saw fit. The Africans in the Cape
were disenfranchised.
In 1948, the Nationalist Party came into power with a bare
majority and a radical policy of Apartheid that it sought to enact
and implement. Once more, it sought to enhance and secure its
electoral standing by terminating the voting rights of the Cape
coloreds. It followed the procedure sanctioned in the Ndlwana
case. This time the South African Supreme Court had a change
of heart. In Harris v. Minister of the Interior56 the Supreme Court
ruled that the separate representation of Voters Act was enacted
in a manner incompatible with the fundamental precept of the
South African Constitution. Indeed, the court ruled that parlia-
ment sitting bicamerally was by definition not a parliament as un-
derstood by the constitutional definition of Parliament and
envisioned in the entrenched sections of the South African act.
The opinion was an extraordinary example of the independence
of the South African judiciary and the importance of law and legal
institutions in balancing the framework of power in a complex
society.
The South African government, however, was intent on
55. Ndlwana v. Hofmeyr, NO & Others 1937 A.D. 229; H. CORDER, JUDGES
AT WORK: THE ROLE AND ATTITUDES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPELLATE JUDICI-
ARY, 1910-50, at 154-55 (1984). For a discussion of racial legislation in South
Africa, see A. MATHEWS, LAW, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA (1972); A.
SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 164-166 (1973).
56. Harris v. Minister of the Interior, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (AD).
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pressing the issue and decided to do so by a direct attack on the
jurisdiction of the court. It enacted the High Court of Parliament
Act, an act designed to make Parliament itself the supreme consti-
tutional tribunal of South Africa. 57 Once more, Harris, the plain-
tiff in the voting rights case, challenged the constitutionality of
the Act in the South African Supreme Court. And once more, the
South Africa Supreme Court upheld Harris's claim.58 The court
held that Parliament was simply not a court and the effort to col-
lapse both the legislative and juridical competence of governance
into parliament itself was unconstitutional. The Court showed
extraordinary statesmanship and courage in standing up to the
Pretoria government. This story, however, does not have a happy
ending.
The South African government, undaunted by these legal re-
buffs, found a loophole in the constitution. The loophole related
to the provisions defining the composition of the senate. The
constitution provided that Parliament determines the composi-
tion of the senate. A new bill was passed-the Extension of the
Senate Act.59 This bill authorized the enlargement of the senate
and permitted the state to appoint senators. Enough senators
were appointed to give the senate the requisite two-thirds major-
ity to disenfranchise the Cape coloreds. This provision was chal-
lenged, but the plaintiff was not as fortunate as Harris. The
South African Supreme Court was simply not able to find a way
around the government's corruption of the constitution in its
drive to consolidate its hold over the South African power pro-
cess. With its extinction of colored voting rights, the state moved
aggressively to legislate and implement its Apartheid program.
One of the symbolic cornerstones of the new age was the promul-
gation of a new, white's only constitution-the republican consti-
tution of 1961. 60 Increased resistance to Apartheid as a
consequence of the new constitution and other issues resulted in
wide-spread civil disobedience and the banning of the major
black political parties. Most importantly, for civil rights, security
laws were enacted which permitted the detention and frequent
torture of detainees, censorship and a wide variety of limitations
on freedom that made South Africa the paradigm case of a post-
World War II police state.
57. Id.
58. Minister of the Interior v. Harris, 1952(4) S.A. 769 (AD).
59. Collins v. Minister of the Interior, 1957(1) S.A. 552 (AD).
60. L. BOULLE, supra note 54.
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After the fall of Vorster, renewed discussions were had inside
South Africa about a new dispensation encouraged by Prime Min-
ister Botha's "adapt or die" speech.6 1 This resulted in a new con-
stitution of 1983. Although the constitution seemed to liberalize
and open up the South African political process, it did nothing of
the sort. The constitution did not contain a Bill of Rights.
Although the preamble spoke of the protection of human rights,
dignity and liberty of the individual, the substantive part of the
constitution discloses that the individual is not given an effective
part in the system's power arrangements. It focuses on the group
rights of the whites, the coloreds and the Indians and does not
include any group rights for Africans in its dispensation.
The constitution establishes a close relationship between the
executive, the armed forces and the security police. In fact, the
1983 constitution made it easier to rule South Africa by emer-
gency decree, which has substantially been the case since 1986.
Although the constitution provides for indian and colored partici-
pation, the framework of effective power remains with the
Afrikaner elite, and the framework of authoritarian control is
structurally legitimized by the constitution, giving the South Afri-
can president dictatorial powers whenever he chooses to exercise
them.
This constitutional arrangement was acknowledged to be
flawed even in governmental circles and it was widely acknowl-
edged that a Bill of Rights was sorely needed in South Africa.6 2
The problem is that a Bill of Rights is a statement about power
relations and unlimited executive power cannot coexist comforta-
bly with a commitment to individual political and civil rights. And
this is where another improbable political event has significantly
influenced South Africa's constitutional landscape of the future.
The imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S. set up an ex-
plicit framework of conditions that had to be met before sanctions
could be lifted. Those conditions include respect for civil and
political rights of the opponents of Apartheid and others.
It is now widely conceded by many that sanctions do work, if
what is meant by "work" is a serious, realistic reappraisal of what
can be done to reshape the legal political landscape of South Af-
rica in ways that honor the human rights of all its citizens. The
emergence of Mr. F. W. deKlerk represented the first unequivocal
61. Positive Developments, supra note 51.
62. Sussens, Bill Seen as Change to Authoritarianism, Eastern Province Herald,
May 24, 1983.
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rejection by a major Afrikaner leader of key tenets of the
Apartheid state and especially those parts of state policy which
institutionalize repression and human rights violations.63 In Mr.
deKlerk's much publicized speech before parliament this year,
Mr. deKlerk suspended executions, pledged the release of polit-
ical prisoners other than those convicted of offenses such as mur-
der, terrorism and arson, pledged to scrap curbs on the media in
their entirety, pledged to terminate the state of emergency "as
soon as circumstances warrant it," and pledged to scrap the Sepa-
rate Amenities Act of 1953.64 Mr. deKlerk also declared that "the
time for negotiations has arrived." Mr. deKlerk indicated that the
unbanning of major black organizations was designed to place
"everybody in a position to pursue politics freely."
Just as Mr. deKlerk was contemplating "Pretoriastroika," he
was faced with a crisis of critical importance. As early as October
and November of 1989, three former South African security po-
licemen asserted in separate versions that they had been involved
in the "death squad" murders of political opponents of
apartheid.65 The first disclosure in October 1989 came from a
death row inmate, Butana Almond Nofomela. Mr. Nofomela's ex-
ecution was stayed pending an investigation. Subsequently his
story was corroborated by his former commanding officer, Cap-
tain Dirk Johannus Coetzee, and another ex-security police func-
tionary, David Tshikalange. Amnesty International has
documented approximately sixty (plus) of these unsolved killings
and over the years has repeatedly asked the Pretoria authorities to
carry out thorough independent investigations after individual in-
quiries were repeatedly inconclusive. 66 In December 1989, Am-
nesty International and others asked President deKlerk to
conduct an independent judicial investigation into the possible
existence of death squads. 67 President deKlerk declined to order
an investigation on the basis of Nofomela's disclosures. As evi-
63. For an examination of the attitudes of South Africans toward the law,
see A. MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: DILEMMAS
OF THE APARTHEID SOCIETY (1988).
64. Heard, Fewer South African Executions Likely as Government Reviews Death
Penalty, Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 1989. For an overview of the key issues in
deKlerk's announcement, see Pretoriastroika: President de Klerk 's Historic Statement to
Parliament, Focus ON SOUTH AFRICA, Feb. 1990, at 1.
65. Hit Squad Probe, Focus ON SOUTH AFRICA, Feb. 1990, at 16; Powell, Guilt
Is a Matter of Innocence in the Upside-Down World of Harms, Weekly Mail, Mar. 16-22,
1990, at 4.
66. South Africa: Political Killings by Security Force 'Death Squads', Amnesty In-
ternational Doc. AFR 53/01/90 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter Political Killings].
67. Id.
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dence mounted, however, he was compelled to call for in impar-
tial investigation, and has appointed a respected South African
judge to undertake the assignment. How that judge's revelations
will impact on the proposed negotiations framework will have to
await further developments. But the findings collected in Am-
nesty International files suggest that the investigations/hearings,
if thoroughly conducted, could be politically explosive. 68
As revealed in his speech, deKlerk's thinking is also reflective
of a considerable level of fertile and imaginative thinking about
South Africa's constitutional possibilities by both black and white
intellectuals and organizations. Most recently, for example, the
ANC, although still in exile and disbanded inside South Africa,
published its constitutional guidelines for a free and democratic
South Africa. Afrikaners themselves have been scouring the in-
ternational landscape for constitutional models that are respon-
sive to the concepts of ethnic diversity and group power. 69 There
seems to me to be two dimensions to the problem. The first is the
definition and scope of the practical framework for negotiations.
Second, how far can constitution-making be from the framework
of actual power relations and how far can it move prescriptively in
shaping a new paradigm of governance in South Africa? In part,
the problem may be viewed as understanding the problems of
group or ethnic identification in the here and now and looking at
the strategies of transformation in a framework of identity that is
more inclusive, i.e., one that embraces all South Africans and the
principles of universal justice, social and economic equity and
human dignity.
The evolution of Afrikaner thinking about constitutional re-
form since the promulgation of the 1983 constitution, and more
pertinently since the fall of P.W. Botha and the rise of F.W.
deKlerk, has become refined and may well provide a useful basis
for negotiations in light of the ANC's published constitutional
guidelines. In an interview with Anthony Lewis of the New York
Times, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen 70 suggested that a two chamber Parlia-
ment, one elected on the basis of a universal franchise and the
other representative of ethnic and possibly geographic factors,
might be more acceptable than a single house of Parliament
based on majoritarian politics. The idea of a second house carries
the implication that it would serve as a check on unbridled majori-
68. Id.
69. See Nagan, supra note 9, at 410-12.
70. Lewis, The New South Africa, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1990 at A27, col. 1.
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tarianism and would presumably have some "blocking"
competence. 71
It is a case of historical irony that the Afrikaners who fought
so tirelessly for unbridled Afrikaner majoritarianism, without the
hated "testing" right, now seek as a cornerstone of their negotiat-
ing posture the institutionalization of "checks and balances" to
protect all minorities, including the whites. 72 The basic idea is
that specific blocking competence should be allocated to the sec-
ond parliamentary house to cover legislation that would impact
minority groups on "important" political issues. Three main ar-
eas have been isolated:
(i) The mandate of regular elections
(ii) The protection of the economic system
(iii) That the first house have its law-making competence
limited from tampering or otherwise compromising
the integrity of an assumed bill of rights.
It is obvious that the second house, if accepted, will be one of
the more interesting institutional challenges for South Africa's
constitution drafters. One suggested approach is to follow the
U.S. practice and elect senators (possibly two) from each geo-
graphic region, however defined. This approach may be further
supplemented by some form of representation from different eth-
nic groups. But the notion of ethnic or racial here, rather than be
dependent on the Population Registration Act and the odious sys-
tem of racial classifications, will in fact be based on volitional affil-
iation; Viljoen even envisages a category for those who reject any
racial or ethnic label, whether imposed or freely chosen. Accord-
ing to Viljoen, "Freedom of Association will be the dominant
factor."73
The new proposals leaked to the press have come on the
heels of intense activity about the constitutional challenges posed
by the ANC's published guidelines, which caught many by sur-
prise because of its liberal, social democratic tenor, as well as by
the rise of deKlerk, the fall of Botha, the freeing of Mandela and
other prisoners, as mandated by the American Sanctions bill, and
the impact of sanctions itself.
I have elsewhere examined the importance of the ANC for-
71. Id.
72. J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER(1978).
73. Lewis, supra note 52.
1168 [Vol. 35: p. 1139
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 6 [1990], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss6/3
GIANNELLA LECTURE
mulation for a post-Apartheid South Africa. I recap here only the
broad outline of what the ANC's proposals entail, and some of
the more obvious shortcomings. The introductory part of the
guidelines states what the ANC's commitment is to a future South
Africa:
(1) The establishment of a non-racial democracy.
(2) To eradicate apartheid and outlaw racial
discrimination.
(3) To promote economic equity with the state playing
an active role.
(4) To promote sex equality.
(5) To protect religious, language and cultural rights.
(6) Institute policies to reconstruct black society because
of heritage of exploitation and discrimination.
There are of course several important questions raised by the
ANC's guidelines. I list for convenience some of the more obvi-
ous ones.
(1) Is majoritarianism the best form of democracy?
(2) Are consociational models of pluralistic democracy
more ethnic-sensitive and flexible as constitutional
alternatives?
(3) Since blacks in 1910 advocated a federal alternative
to the white dominated Westminster model, does
federalism hold promise as a possible model?
(4) What is the juridical status of a bill of rights and an
independent judiciary? The ANC guidelines are not
clear here.
(5) Are there any group rights that merit constitutional
protection?74
The process of negotiations envisioned by the leading play-
ers in the South African drama must come to grips with several
different but interrelated challenges if they can be productive.
First, a continuance of the spiral of revolutionary and reactionary
violence will make negotiations indescribably difficult and will in
all probability continue the state of emergency. This is a datum
well known to the white chauvinists associated with the AWB and
the black chauvinists associated with Inkatha, and other extreme
black consciousness groups. 75 Second, even without the interven-
74. Political Killings, supra note 66.
75. Irvine, Violnce in Natal: Political Implications, in IDASA 59-66 (1990).
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tion of polarized racial chauvinism, there remains a large reser-
voir of insecurity on the part of white South Africa. Many white
South Africans believe that, in the crunch, black control may
mean the implementation of Apartheid in reverse. The degree of
distrust on the part of black South Africa also represents an enor-
mous gulf when the historical legacy of three hundred years of
colonial oppression is capped by forty-two years of unremitting
Apartheid repression.
I believe that negotiations can and must realistically strive for
two key policies in the immediate future. First, a conscious policy
of contained tension. Since the negotiating parties will be com-
municating the language of political demand, it must be acknowl-
edged that that language comes freighted with a vast reservoir of
emotion, feeling, anxiety and distrust. A system of contained ten-
sion which secures the minimum order will secure the first princi-
ple of constitutionalism-the management of power as an
element of the containment of conflict. The minimum order
therefore is essential for realistic constitutional progress. Sec-
ond, concurrent with the negotiation process, the Pretoria au-
thorities should take the initiative in planning for the economic
reconstruction of black South Africa with a particular emphasis on
urban development. What might be envisioned here would be
something of a Marshall Plan combined with an economic and so-
cial New Deal. Such an exercise in enlightened economic self in-
terest would speed the negotiations process and possibly
generate symbols of good faith and trust such that matters of
common advantage may be more clearly seen by the relevant ac-
tors. Such a policy may also speed the demise of international
economic sanctions against South Africa.
In my view the business of constitution-making must inevita-
bly accept some levels of imperfection. We know the fate of many
idealistic, near perfect constitutions in many parts of Africa and
indeed the Eastern Europe of yesteryear. Cynical intellectuals in
Eastern Europe used to talk of their constitutions as "posters."
In Africa many leading scholars are so disenchanted with the state
of constitutional law based as they see it on paper constitutions,
that they openly talk of states having constitutions without consti-
tutional law. A part of the problem is the lack of correspondence
between constitutive process and the process of effective power.
Constitutive process when they function realistically restrain the
abuse of power. As Karl Llwewllyn once implied it, a constitution
is not a scrap of paper with a set of frozen, reified, mummified
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meanings. 76 The constitution he said was an institution, a living
dynamic institution.
The relationship between law and power or more precisely
constitutional law and power must ultimately be seen as an imper-
fect incomplete evolving process and the negotiating process en-
visioned in South Africa is, in itself, in reality only a part of a more
comprehensive but continuing constitutive process in South Af-
rica. Even more importantly, the negotiating process may mask a
vital operational reality, namely, that South Africa's own constitu-
tive process has already generated expectations about the alloca-
tion of basic decisional authority in the 1990s. Additionally, the
international community acting through the U.N. and acting
through major international players like the United States have
been in the business of recommending, sanctioning and even pre-
scribing standards for South Africa's constitutional future.
If the negotiators are successful in emerging with a document
or representative symbol, the meaning and relevance of that sym-
bol or myth will doubtless be shaped, nurtured and defined in
ways that are reminiscent of the difficulties that characterize our
own volatile experience with constitutional law. There will always
be hard issues of constitutional governance that require re-
sponses. In South Africa some of the hard issues have been dwelt
upon. The core idea of constitutionalism of the Afrikaner re-
mains very much the idea that constitutionalism must be group
dominated. In extreme form this suggests that individual identity
has no constitutional relevance apart from group identity. The
theory assumes that the group is the basis of all social organiza-
tion and especially of power relations in society. On the other
hand the popular appeal of majority rule with a weak commitment
to individual rights serves only to erode the credibility of democ-
racy when individual rights are sacrificed at the alter of majority
rule.
A heavy focus of constitutionalism on individual rights makes
assumptions that the principle of autonomy is both psychologi-
cally and normatively appropriate-individual autonomy in ex-
treme form being independent of group identity. While the
notion of individual autonomy is attractive, it is sometimes seen
as denying the social reality that the individual's relation to the
community involves complex levels of interdependence and in-
76. See Llwellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1934); see also M. McDOUGAL, THE APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIVE PREscRIP-
TIONS: AN ADDENDUM TO JUSTICE CARDOZO 15 (1978).
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terdetermination. A more sophisticated approach to the problem
of the individual and the group observes that in fact individuals
have multiple lives and multiple identities in society with myriad
groups and alignments. Indeed, it is part of the genius of the ide-
ology of social democracy to underline the fact that human beings
can have multiple group lives and identities within and across
group lines and that these identities co-exist simultaneously.
Hence, the same person could be:
Individual Identity Group Identity
artist artistic guild
wife ) member of family,
husband ) kinship unit
child )
voter party member
parishioner church affiliation
university graduate alumnis
worker trade union
lawyer bar association
doctor medical association
etc.
For this reason I suspect that the concern for the protection of
minority group rights must start with the individual's right to as-
sociate, and second any consideration of the bewildering forms of
association that individuals experience and which impact on their
systems of identity should indicate that while race and ethnicity
are important they are not exclusive indicators of identity.
One of the most effective ways to protect minority rights is to
protect individual rights. The protection of individual rights in
the political, economic, cultural and social spheres, insures the
freedom to participate and to associate as are compatible with the
like rights of others. In other words, the core principal of human
dignity implied in maximizing the freedom of choice, the fairness
of social and economic equity, is the principle of mutual, recipro-
cal respect. The key to the protection of the minority from the
tyranny of the majority is to put core civil and political, some cul-
tural and economic rights beyond the reach of ephemeral majori-
ties and guarantee them as core individual rights. This
framework is the one that more than any other, we know of as the
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grantor of minority rights-the right to be different, diverse-plu-
ral if you will. In short, respect for the known human rights
agenda provides the most legitimate and probably in the long
term, the best known paradigm of law and politics for the protec-
tion of minority group rights.
The philosophic question of the constitutional future of
South Africa therefore leaves open many questions about an an-
cient but persistent problem: the dualism between the individual
identity and the collective identity. After 300 years of unremit-
ting darkness in a very long tunnel, there are glimmers of hope
that the tunnel may have an exit, and that the exit is within reach.
At present a few candles have been lit to permit the travellers to
catch a faint glimpse of who they are, and why they are there. At
least as we say in Amnesty, they have lit candles to point the way
forward rather than incessantly cursing the darkness.
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